



Contact Tracing mobile apps cross-border interoperability

eHealth Network

Technical Experts – “Infected keys” work stream


2020-05-25

Meeting purpose

Agree on cross-border interoperability architecture:

1. Essential data to be uploaded
2. Backend – federated or roaming

Covid-19 in Europe



| # | Country, Other | Total Cases | New Cases |
|----|-----------------------------|-------------|-----------|
| 2 | Spain | 282,370 | +466 |
| 3 | UK | 257,154 | +2,959 |
| 4 | Italy | 229,327 | +669 |
| 5 | France | 182,469 | +250 |
| 6 | Germany | 179,986 | +273 |
| 7 | Belgium | 56,810 | +299 |
| 8 | Netherlands | 45,064 | +176 |
| 9 | Belarus | 35,244 | +941 |
| 10 | Sweden | 33,188 | +379 |
| 11 | Switzerland | 30,725 | +18 |
| 12 | Portugal | 30,471 | +271 |
| 13 | Ireland | 24,582 | +76 |

| # | Country, Other | Total Cases | New Cases |
|----|--|-------------|-----------|
| 14 | Poland | 20,931 | +312 |
| 15 | Ukraine | 20,580 | +432 |
| 16 | Romania | 17,857 | +145 |
| 17 | Austria | 16,486 | +50 |
| 18 | Denmark | 11,289 | +59 |
| 19 | Serbia | 11,092 | +68 |
| 20 | Czechia | 8,890 | +77 |
| 21 | Norway | 8,346 | +14 |
| 22 | Moldova | 6,994 | +147 |
| 23 | Finland | 6,568 | +31 |
| 24 | Luxembourg | 3,990 | +9 |
| 25 | Hungary | 3,713 | +35 |
| 26 | Greece | 2,876 | +2 |
| 27 | Bulgaria | 2,408 | +36 |
| 28 | Bosnia and Herzegovina | 2,391 | +19 |

| # | Country, Other | Total Cases | New Cases |
|----|---------------------------------|-------------|-----------|
| 29 | Croatia | 2,243 | |
| 30 | North Macedonia | 1,941 | +20 |
| 31 | Estonia | 1,821 | +14 |
| 32 | Iceland | 1,804 | +1 |
| 33 | Lithuania | 1,616 | +12 |
| 34 | Slovakia | 1,504 | +1 |
| 35 | Slovenia | 1,468 | |
| 36 | Latvia | 1,046 | +16 |
| 37 | Albania | 989 | +8 |
| 38 | Andorra | 762 | |
| 39 | San Marino | 665 | +4 |
| 40 | Malta | 609 | +9 |
| 41 | Channel Islands | 558 | |
| 42 | Isle of Man | 336 | |
| 43 | Montenegro | 324 | |

Contact tracing app

Situation across MS (to be confirmed)

| | Decentralized (DP-3T or G/A) | Centralized | COVID app not for contact tracing, or contact tracing ruled out | Total |
|--|---|-------------|---|-------|
| In Use | AT, CZ | NO, HU | SK | 5 |
| Planned and/or publicly announced | EE, IE, DE, FI, IT, LV, NL, PL LT, MT, CY, HR, PT, | FR | BE, LU, SE, SL | 18 |
| Total | 13 | 3 | 5 | 21 |
| To be confirmed | <i>ES, BU, EL, RO</i> | | | |
| | | | | |

Pre-COVID cross-border movement within EU

- 17 million EU citizens are living in MS other than their country of citizenship
- 1.4 m cross-border workers
- One-third of EU citizens travel to other MS as tourists
- 2m reimbursements for cross-border healthcare p.a.

Sources: Eurostat and ECA

Android / iOS APIs

- Apple/Google APIs released 22 April 2020
- A/G: Use of country codes of proximity contacts in BLE payload **raises privacy and security concerns:**
 - a) It breaks the principle that infected users only upload information about themselves, not about other users;
 - b) information collected in proximity encounters is encrypted and cannot be read by the receiving app;
 - c) exposing country codes, esp in an open format (without encryption), could lead to “foreigner scanner”.

Agreement required on

A. Alternatives for **determinative data** for cross-border interoperability

1. **Infected users' visited countries list: List of countries a user has travelled to**

1. Automatically detected by device (part of consent when installing the app)
2. Manually entered by user (not recommended for security and usability reasons)
3. **Hybrid – pop-up window with pre-determined countries automatically proposed (with fall back possibility: user input information manually)**

B. Three options for **backend architecture** for cross-border interoperability

1. Backend federation
2. Backend federation + Forwarding gateway
3. Trusted traveller server (roaming server)



Open Issues

- *Automatically detected by device (part of consent when installing the app)*
 - Questions for A&G?

Backend architecture

for cross-border interoperability



Backend architecture (Possible options)

A. Backend federation

- **What it is:** slide 14
- + Lean architecture
- Possibility to identify the MS of origin of infected keys (*the receiving Backend Server*) [*can be mitigated with dummy keys, but may increase bandwidth*]

B. Backend federation + forwarding gateway


- **What it is:** slide 16
- + Not possible to identify the MS of origin of infected keys
- + Fault tolerance (when B is down [message querying handling])
- Introduction of forwarding server (*single forward infrastructure*)

C. Trusted Traveller Server (roaming server)

- **What it is:** slide 18
- + Not possible to identify the MS of origin of infected keys
- + One server can sign "infected keys archives" for all EU MS
- Single point of failure for travellers
- App travellers still need to check backend servers visited countries.
- What is needed to build such Server
- Increase the amount of storage of keys.

Which one?

Steps in the contact tracing flow




Steps in the contact tracing flow

| Number | Step | Description | Decentralised |
|--------|--|---|--|
| 1 | Enable user with necessary technology | When a user updates the mobile device operative system or/and installs a contact tracing app | (1) Update OS or/and install app |
| 2 | Proximity contact detection | When activated by the user, the mobile device technology detects proximity contacts with other app users and record encounter details | (2.1) Detect proximity contacts (2.2) Add new visited MS |
| 3 | Infection confirmation | When an individual is informed, by the relevant authorities, about his/her positive test result for SARS-CoV-2 or suspicion of COVID-19 | (3.1) Authorise infected keys sharing (3.2) Upload infected keys and visited MSs (3.3) Forward relevant infected keys to MSs |
| 4 | Exposure risk calculation | When a proximity encounter exposure risk score is calculated | (4.1) Retrieve infected keys (4.2) Exposure risk calculation |
| 5 | Exposure alert and follow up | When a user gets an alert about possible exposure and possible follow up actions | (5) Alert exposed user and follow up |


A. Backend federation

(visiting user infected)




A. Backend federation

(home user infected)




B. Backend federation + forwarding gateway

(visiting user infected)




B. Backend federation + forwarding gateway

(home user infected)




C. Trusted traveller server

(visiting user infected)



C. Trusted traveller server

(home user infected)



Open questions

- Can an app listen “freely” all Backend servres (from all MS).
 - The end points are public, no app authentication required.
- If a user selects visited all countries, what will be the weight for bandwidth?
 - 10Mb per country, per user, per day (Infected users per country: 900k).

Next steps

- Next meeting: 28 May, 16:30 (120 min)
 - Prepare document with possibilities for the 2 architectures (*including further details on the forwarding gateway*) and Experts will provide *pros and cons*.

NOT YET

- Update Toolbox with agreed way forward
- Implement architecture (coding)
 - App checking backend servers in other (visited) MS
 - Mechanism to validate infected users abroad (automatic)
- Identify and log issues eg with API
 - coordinated discussions with A/G
- Communications